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On December 31, 1974, American citizens
were, for the first time in 41 years, legally permit-
ted to buy, sell and hold gold bullion. The extent
to which they exercise this privilege will depend
largely on their private views concerning the future
rate of increase in the price of gold and the var-
iance in this rate of change. In other words, will
the price of gold increase faster than the general
price level, and will variations in its price be suffi-
ciently narrow so as not to expose holders to undue
risks? The purpose of this article is to examine the
role of gold as a private hedge against inflation.
This will be done by analyzing the factors which
have determined the price of gold during both the
distant and more recent past, in order to come to
some conclusion regarding gold's possible role as
an inflation hedge during 1975 and beyond.
Gold Prices
Whether or not gold proves to be a good infla-
tion hedge for the private U.S. citizen obviously
depends upon the amount of appreciation in the
dollar value of his gold holdings between the time
that he buys the gold and the time that he sells it
(Chart 1). In this regard, our primary criterion for
evaluating gold's performance as an inflation
hedge is the degree to which the price of gold
moves with the general price level (either up or
down). The question of whether gold is a good in-
vestment depends upon factors other than its role
as an inflation hedge, mainly the return available
on alternate investments. We will consider both is-
sues here.
the same interval the value of other U.S. goods
declined by about 30 percent as measured by the
wholesale price index. Hence, a gold purchase in
1929 would have been an unusually good invest-
ment because while most prices were falling, the
gold price rose in succeeding years (Chart 2a).
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Timing one's purchase obviously is very impor-
tant. For example, someone purchasing gold in
1929 and legally entitled to hold it beyond 1933
1
would have seen each ounce ofhis gold investment
increase by 69.5 percent, from $20.65 in 1929 to
$35.00 on January 31, 1934, when the Roosevelt
Administration officially revalued gold. During
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On the other hand, if our hypothetical gold
buyer had purchased gold in February 1934, after
gold's official price had been raised, and if he held
his gold until 1968, he would have gained only a
12-percent rise in price, compared with a
165-percent rise in wholesale prices (Chart 2b).
Hence, during this 34-year period, gold would
have been no hedge against inflation; indeed, our
buyer would have lost more than one-half of the
purchasing power of his gold.
Finally, if our buyer had purchased bullion in
1968, his gold investment would have been a good
inflation hedge by the end of 1969, no hedge at all
by year-end 1970 and 1971, and an excellent
hedge by year-end 1972, 1973, and 1974 (Chart
2c). Nevertheless, there is no assurance that gold
purchased now would continue to be a good infla-
tion hedge. Gold purchased on December 30,
1974 at the London afternoon gold-fixing price of
$195.25 per ounce, a record until that time, fell by
$25.75 per ounce over the next week. Expost, we
see the necessity of timing one's gold purchases
well if one desires to hold gold as a worthwhile
inflation hedge.
As Chart 3 demonstrates, the variance in gold
prices has increased as the price of gold has
increased.2 Hence, the risk ofbuying high and sell·
ing low has increased through time; this risk, of
course, is one of the costs of holding gold, of
which more shortly.
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In the most recent period, when gold prices have
shown their most dramatic increases, prices of
other internationally-traded goods have also risen
very sharply. As Chart 4 demonstrates, world
export-price indices for all commodities - and
primary commodities in particular - increased
substantially between the first quarter of 1971 and
the first quarter of 1974 (latest data available).
During this three-year period, gold prices rose by
nearly 290 percent, while export prices of all
commodities rose by more than 50 percent, and
those for primary commodities increased by more
than 160 percent. Hence, the gold price has been
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Before proceeding further in an analysis ofgold
as a commodity investment, we need to be aware
of the essential difference between this and other
commodities, and the many costs (as well as ben-
efits) incurred in buying, selling and holding
gold. Because of its historical monetary role, gold
cannot (yet) be treated like any other commodity,
whether it be soybeans, pork bellies or steel scrap.
Even now, despite official U.S. efforts to de-
monetize gold, it is still regarded by many nations,
including the United States, as an integral part of
their international reserves.
Besides being a possibly good hedge against in-
flation, gold ownership may bestow other benefits.
These include the psychological satisfaction from
holding a metal which historically has provided
security in times of trouble and uncertainty, as well
as the enjoyment of gold's intrinsic physical prop-
erties. However, these benefits must be matched
against the possible costs ofgold ownership. There
is an opportunity cost in terms of the benefits that
could be obtained from holding other goods in-
stead of gold - from holding, for example, other
commodities, foreign currencies, and interest-
bearing financial assets. The prices of all com-
modities, industrial commodities, and metals and
metal products each increased faster than the gold
price between 1934 and 1973 (Table 1), so that a
basket of various commodities held during that
period would have been a better inflation hedge
than the single commodity gold. By November
1974, only the prices of metal and metal products
continued to remain above those for gold. Thus,
depending on the period chosen for comparison,
investments in other commodities may be better in-
flation hedges than gold.3
Foreign currencies may at times be a better
hedge than gold against increases in the U.S. gen-
eral price level. Since various currencies were al-
lowed to float against the U.S. dollar in June 1970,
the dollar has depreciated against some currencies
(Table 2), and appreciated against others. While
each dollar now buys 80.8 percent less gold than it
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did in May 1970, the dollar also buys less foreign
currency - in particular, 48.5 percent fewer Swiss
francs and 41.9 percent fewer German marks. One
must thus conclude that gold has been a better in-
flation hedge than foreign currency in that particu-
lar time span, May 1970 to December 1974. This
is because the current inflation is worldwide in na-
ture, so that even a "strong" currency (such as the
German deutschemark) has experienced record in-
flation rates by recent historical standards. In such
an environment, a commodity will always be
superior to currency. However, when the current
bout of worldwide inflation ends, that particular
advantage of gold should also end.
Interest-bearing financial assets are another al-
ternative to gold. While interest rates rose to re-
cord levels in 1973 and 1974, they still did not
compensate investors for inflation because the
nominal rate ofinterest - which included an infla-
tion premium over and above the real interest rate
- was less than the actual inflation rate. As a re-
sult, investors were attracted to commodities, such
as gold, during this period. Nevertheless, financial









1966 1968 1970 1972 1974store of value than gold. For example, if a conser-
vative U.S. investor had placed the equivalent of
$1 million in West Germany in 1949 at an average
yearly rate of 6.75 percent, he could have repa-
triated $8.8 million by June 1974. In comparison,
$1 millioninvested in gold at $35 perounce in 1949
would represent today a value of $4.5 million, less
storage charges over a period of 25 years.
4 In this
example, the investor in deutschemarks benefited
not only from the compound interest on his invest-
ment, but also from the appreciation of the West
German mark.
There are many other risks and costs involved in
holding gold besides the opportunity costs in-
volved in not holding other commodities, foreign
currencies, or paper assets. For example, gold
prices fluctuate widely, especially in the short-run,
as speculative activity develops in a thin market
because of the relatively small demand for use in
the arts and industry in relation to current supply
(Chart 3). Moreover, the extent of speculative
buying is a function of the current price and the
expectation that the gold price will rise by at least
the cost ofowning and holding gold. Ifthis expec-
tation is not realized, the price must fall enough to
create a new expectation of a rise. These changes
in speculators' expectations result in gold prices
fluctuating more than the prices of other com-
modities.
The illiquidity of gold investment and the large
variance in gold prices represent real costs of own-
ership. Ifcircumstances require the quick sale of a
gold asset, such a sale is more likely to occur in a
down market than is the case with alternative in-
vestments. Moreover, buying and holding gold in-
clude costs of fabrication, packaging, shipping,
handling, storage, insurance and state sales taxes.
Such costs may boost the cost of the typical pur-
chase tomorethan20 to 30 percent above the free-
market price for gold bullion. In addition, transac-
tion costs of between 6 and 15 percent may be
charged for trading by dealers; usually, these costs
are higher for small than for large transactions. As
a result, the free-market price would have to rise
more than 20 percent before the purchaser could
recover his total buying and selling costs. Because
of the risks associated with counterfeiting, he
would also have to pay assay costs whenever he
decided to sell his holdings. Thus, holding gold as
an asset in one's portfolio requires much expertise.
Those who are tempted to view gold as a good
inflation hedge ignore the fact that it may not be
better than other hedges and that there are many
costs involved.
Gold During the Greenback Period
Besides the recent (1968-74) experience, one
other period in American history had no
officially-fixed price of gold in terms of the U.S.
dollar; namely, the Greenback Period from 1862
to 1879. 5 The average monthly price of gold var-
ied widely during this period, but by 1879, the Un-
ited States was back on the gold standard at the
pre-Civil War parity. The price level rose
throughout the Civil War, then dropped 50 percent
between 1865 and 1879, with the price of gold in
greenbacks moving in parallel. A unit of gold in
greenbacks that was worth a dollar before the war
was worth $2.50 in 1865, before beginning to de-
cline. Given this historical perspective, anyone
wishing to make a good investment would have
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been well-advised to trade his greenbacks for gold
at the beginning ofthe Civil War and then to trade
back in 1864 when the gold price was at its height.
Different supply and demand factors operated
during the 1862-79 period than during the more
recent (1968-74) period. A century ago, the price
of gold was essentially the dollar-pound exchange
rate. With the United Kingdom on the gold stan-
dard, the Bank of England stood ready to settle
transactions at the rate of one pound sterling per
unit of gold. Hence, the gold price in terms of
greenbacks was determined by the demand and
supply for greenbacks vis-a-vis the pound sterling.
Although gold was traded on the New York StockExchange, its price in terms of greenbacks re-
flected changes in the day-to-day value of green-
backs vis-a-vis British pounds in the foreign-
exchange market. Today, no country operates on a
gold standard; instead, all major currencies float
against each other, and the gold price also floats
freely in its own market. Nevertheless, one impli-
cation may be drawn from the experience of a cen-
tury ago: if the price of gold is not fixed by gov-
ernment action to a given currency, then gold is a
good investment only during inflation and is a very
bad buy during deflation.
Gold Price Determinants - Supply
In order to evaluate gold's future value as an in-
flation hedge, we need to consider those supply
and demand factors which resulted in generally-
rising gold prices during the past seven years and,
in particular, during the past four years. While part
of the recent price increase may be traced to a
stock-adjustment process which occurred when the
gold price was set free, most of the increase re-
flects changing supply-and-demand forces which
have implications for the future price of gold.
Stock and flow determinants affect both the
supply and demand sides of the gold market. On
the supply flow side, free-world output decreased
from 1,288 metric tons in 1970 to an estimated
1,034 metric tons in 1974, a drop of almost 20
percent in four years (Table 3). South Africa, the
dominant producer, accounted for more than 90
percent of the production decline. Labor problems,
a shortage of skilled technicians, and occasional
operational difficulties contributed to the lower
South African output. This decline also reflected
the perverse short-run elasticity of supply in re-
sponse to higher gold prices; gold producers have
been either encouraged or required to transfer men
and equipment to mining poorer-quality veins, in
an attempt to conserve higher-quality ore, and
hence to extend the life of the mines. A
downward-sloping flow supply curve is implied by
South Africa's emphasis on long-run rather than
short-run production considerations, which depend
on that producer's expectations regarding long-run
prices and mining costs. This policy assumes that
incentives to increased exploration will not lead to
increased gold discoveries. Ifthe assumption is in-
correct, then South Africa's limitation on current
production will be self-defeating.
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In contrast, the U.S.S.R., the world's second
largest producer, increased its annual gold produc-
tion from 304 metric tons in 1968 to 371 metric
tons in 1973, an increase of almost 22 percent
(Table 3). Nevertheless, only a portion ofthe Rus-
sian output is sold in the West each year - an
estimated 220 metric tons in 1974. Altogether, the
total supply in Western gold markets declined from
1,634 tons in 1970 to 1,473 tons in 1973.
World supply is also dependent on the gold
strategies and foreign-exchange needs of South
Africa and the U.S.S.R. Russian sales depend
largely on the market price and on the size of
liabilities incurred by the U.S.S.R. in its transac-
tions with the West. These sales were particularly
large in the 1972-74 period, but there is no guaran-
tee that they will continue to be so. In the South
African case, the Reserve Bankperforms the role of
a price leader by withholding gold from the market
in the face of sluggish demand or an unusual in-
crease in supply, such as the recent Treasury sales
from the U.S. gold stock.
Conflicting factors thus have affected produc-
tion during the recent period of rising gold prices.
Hence, from the supply flow point of view, the
private inflation-hedger cannot feel confident that
gold prices will continue to rise faster than the
general price level. World production apparently
declined in 1974 for the fourth straight year, help-
ing ceteris paribus to raise the gold price. For the
longer-run, however, higher gold prices are likely
to result in more gold production.
The supply-stock side of the market is domi-
nated by the amount ofmonetary gold held by cen-
tral banks and by the amount in private gold hold-ings, which together are many times larger than
annual world production. Total stocks today may
approximate 3.7 billion ounces. Central-bank
holdings alone are more than 25 times as large as
annual production. Incidentally, the United States
still holds more than any other nation, accounting
for more than 23 percent of central-bank holdings
at the end of November 1974 (Table 4).
Consequently, if central banks sold off only 4
percent of their gold stocks, they could have a dis-
astrous effect on prices, because that would equal
the total world production for an entire year. The
U.S. Treasury conducted such a sale on January 6,
1975, when 753.6 thousand ounces - from a total
of2 million ounces offered at auction - were sold
at prices varying between $153.00 and $185.00
per ounce. Future sales either by the U.S. or
foreign governments are always a possibility. In
fact, Senator William Proxmire, new Chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee, recently said that
he will introduce a bill requiring the Treasury to
sell 25 million ounces of gold (9 percent of its
stock) in 1975 at prevailing market prices. Such
sales should certainly tend to lessen gold's role as a
good hedge against inflation.
A decision by foreign central banks to sell their
stocks in the free market will depend largely on
their views concerning gold's future role as inter-
national money. If gold is gradually demonetized,
then central bankers may gradually sell off their
gold holdings. The trend towards the use ofgold as
collateral for loans (as recently done by Italy) is a
practical step in this direction.
Gold Price Determinants - Demand
The demand for gold depends on stock and flow
considerations, as does the supply. There is a flow
demand for gold for industrial, commercial and ar-
tistic purposes. There is also a stock demand for
purposes of inventory building, whether it be by
central banks or by private hoarders, investors and
speculators. As gold prices have risen, flow de-
mand generally has declined (Table 5). The largest
decline has occurred in jewelry fabrication, which
in 1973 was less than half of the 1970 level as a
consequence of the 170-percent rise in gold prices
over that period. At currently high prices, flow
demand may continue to decrease in 1975 and
beyond, reflecting the high price elasticity of de-
mand for gold jewelry, and also for coins, medals
and medallions. Another factor likely to reduce
flow demand is the current world recession, which
is causing a decline in demand for most raw mater-
ials, including gold.
The private stock demand for gold increased in
the 1972-74 period, as world inflation accelerated
and as investors bought gold as an inflation hedge.
This demand could continue to increase during
1975, the first year of legal bullion purchases for
American citizens. In contrast, central-bank stock
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demand has been constant for several years. In-
creased official gold holdings overseas (71.8 mil-
lion ounces) were almost matched by declining
official U.S. gold holdings (62.8 million ounces)
between the end of 1969 and late 1974 (Table 4).
The speculative and investment demands for
gold became very large in 1973, and undoubtedly
continued high in 1974, with investors and
speculators buying relatively large amounts of of-
ficial gold coins. Hoarding demand meanwhile
expanded in 1973 after an earlier decline. It should
be noted that different factors underlie each of
these three types ofdemand. Hoarding demand is
strongest in those parts of the world with a long
record of political and economic turmoil, such as
France and South and East Asia, particularly
India. Gold is regarded in those areas as the ulti-
mate store of value, as well as a means of ex-
change in times ofemergency or flight. Hoarding
demand appears to be price elastic as indicated by
Table 5, which shows smaller or negative addi-
tions to hoards during the recent period of rising
gold prices.





buy and hold gold for an extended period, at least
until investment in other assets becomes more at-
tractive. In contrast, the motive for speculative
demand is to profit from short-run variations in
gold prices, buying when the price is relatively low
and selling when it is relatively high. Both ofthese
types of demand have been encouraged by the
1973-74 inflation, and also by the expectations of
inflation which many market participants hold for
1975. Inflation and inflation expectations promote
speculative commodity purchases rather than cur-
rency or paper-asset retention.
Central-bank demand has decreased in recent
years, reflecting the continued efforts to de-
monetize gold. When the two-tier market was es-
tablished in March 1968, central banks agreed not
to purchase any newly mined gold, nor to buy or
sell gold on private markets. In 1973, this agree-
ment was terminated, and central banks may now
sell gold in the free market at going prices. How-
ever, International Monetary Fund rules currently
prohibit government purchases in the free market
at more than the official price of$42.22 per ounce.
Hence, central-bank gold purchases have been
minimal in recent years. The trend to demonetiza-
tion was confirmed this January, when France
abolished the official price of its gold reserves.
Between March 1968 (when the two-tier market
was established), and September 1974, gold re-
serves of non-Communist nations increased only
one percent (11.6 million ounces), reflecting re-
strictions on central-bank purchases during this
period. South Africa accounted for all of the in-
crease since 1971. Because the South African Re-
serve Bank purchases all of that nation's output
and releases gold in the free market only when it
desires to do so, its recent tendency to add to its
stocks reflects its intention (as the world's domi-
nant producer) to keep gold prices high.
Future Course of Gold Prices
Gold is unlikely to be a good short-term hedge
against inflation, because ofthe wide price fluctua-
tions which can occur on a month-to-month basis.
Even during the inflationary 1972-74 period, the
price of gold sometimes fell for months at a time
(Chart 3).
Over the entire course of the 1972-74 inflation,
gold turned out to be an excellent investment.
Nevertheless, the remaining years of this decade
will inevitably bring changes in the many supply
and demand factors which determine its price.
This paper has shown the many costs and risks in-
volved in gold-market participation, as well as the
complexity of factors which affect the gold price.
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Hence, caveat emptor: gold may not continue to
be a good private hedge against inflation.
Among the many price determinants analyzed
here, gold's role as a hedge against world inflation
is one of the most important. Just as domestic in-
flation is strongly influenced by growth in the
domestic money stock, so world inflation is also
influenced by growth in the world money stock.6
World money is a common factor in the demand
functions of all internationally traded goods (in-
cluding gold). Thus, the rate of increase in the
world money stock will, with a substantial lag,
lead to an increase in the prices of internationally
traded goods. When world money growth was rela-tively moderate, as in the period from 1963
through 1968, internationally traded goods prices
were stable (Chart 5). However, when world
money growth later accelerated sharply, prices of
internationally traded goods responded. Given the
substantial lag between world money and world
prices, the stability in world money growth which
was resumed in early 1973 should be reflected in
FOOTNOTES
1 In 1933, U.S. citizens were forbidden by law to own gold
except by license from the U.S. Department ofthe Treasury for
certain specified artistic, commercial and industrial purposes.
At the end of 1973, U.S. restrictions were eased on the holding
ofgold coins originally minted prior to 1960. OnDecember 31,
1974, U.S. citizens were once again legally entitled to pur-
chase, sell and hold gold bullion.
2 Technically, it would be more appropriate in Chart 3 to plot
percentage changes in the gold price rather than absolute
changes, but for practical purposes it makes little difference.
3 The choice ofany commodity as an inflation hedge depends
crucially upon the particular time span in which it is held, as
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renewed stability in world prices in 1975.
A renewal of stable prices for internationally
traded goods should reduce demand for gold as an
inflation hedge. Given the relatively small demand
for gold for other purposes at its current price, this
could lead to a substantial fall in the price ofgold.
well as the price appreciation of that particular commodity as
compared with the increase in the general price level during the
period in question.
4 Charles R. Stahl, American Metal Markets' Gold Confer-
ence, October 1974. David O. Tyson, "Record Gold Price
Abroad Anticipates Dominance of Coming U.S. Market,
Dealers Feel", American Banker, November 12, 1974, p. I.
5 For a more detailed discussion of this period, see Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz, A Monetary History of the
United States 1867-1960 (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1963), pp. 15-88.
6 World money stock may be measured by the total interna-




Gold Price All Industrial Metals and
Period (Free-market average) Commodities Commodities Metal Products
1934 100 100 100 100
1940 100 105.0 106.1 111.4
1950 100 212.0 187.6 196.1
1960 100 245.9 229.2 273.3
1968 112.2 265.6 246.5 303.5
1969 117.5 276.0 254.9 320.9
1970 102.7 286.0 264.5 345.2
1971 116.6 295.2 274.1 352.0
1972 166.3 308.7 283.5 365.3
1973 277.8 349.0 302.7 392.7
1974 (Nov.) 519.1 445.4 398.7 552.2
Sources: Gold Price: Index constructed from London gold price data (U.S. dollars per ounce fine at daily fixing), Annual
Bullion Review, Samuel Montagu and Co. Ltd., London, various years; and DowJones News Service, Dow Jones and Co.
Inc., New York, New York, daily reports for November 1974. U.S. Wholesale Prices: Index constructed from the B.L.S.
wholesale-price index, Economic Report ofthe President (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974), and Monthly
LaborReview, December 1974.
Table 2
Depreciation ofthe Dollar vis-a-vis
Gold and Foreign Currencies






















Estimated World Gold Production
(metric tons)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
South Africa 969.5 973.0 1000.4 976.3 908.7 852.3 n.a.
Canada 85.3 79.2 74.9 70.3 64.7 59.9 n.a.
United States 46.0 53.9 54.2 46.5 44.4 36.7 n.a.
Ghana 22.6 22.0 21.9 21.7 22.5 22.7 n.a.
Philippines 16.4 17.8 18.7 19.8 18.7 18.2 n.a.
Australia 24.3 21.7 19.4 20.9 23.4 18.0 n.a.
Rhodesia 15.5 14.9 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 n.a.
Japan 7.0 7.7 8.0 7.9 7.4 7.8 n.a.
Colombia 7.5 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.9 6.5 n.a.
Mexico 5.5 5.6 6.2 4.7 4.5 4.7 n.a.
Zaire 5.3 5.5 5.5 5.4 4.3 3.6 n.a.
Other Non-Communist
Countries 43.3 52.9 56.8 55.1 52.8 48.0 n.a.
Total Non-Communist 1248.2 1261.0 1287.9 1250.1 1172.9 1094.0 1034.2
U.S.S.R. 304.2 318.2 335.5 344.8 360.2 370.6 n.a.
Other Communist
Countries 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 8.4 n.a.
Estimated world
total 1560.8 1587.6 1633.8 1603.3 1541.5 1473.0 n.a.
Sales by the
U.S.S.R. to the West 10 60 220 280 220
Sources: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports, June 1973, p. 116, and June 1974, p. 123.
Peter D. Fells, Gold 1974 (London: Consolidated Gold Fields, Ltd., 1974), pp. 24 and 47.
E. M. Bernstein, Ltd. U.S. Participation in the Free Gold Market, Report No. 75/1, p. 3.
30Table 4
Official Gold Reserves
(millions of ounces at end of period)
Nov.
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
United States 311.2 338.8 316.3 291.6 276.0 276.0 276.0
Rest of World* 857.5 833.1 863.0 884.4 905.3 904.7 904.9
Total World** 1168.7 1171.9 1179.3 1176.0 1181.3 1180.7 1180.9
* Rest of World includes International Monetary Fund
** Excludes U.S.S.R., other Eastern European countries, and Peoples Republic of China.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Vol. 28, No. I, January 1975.
Table 5
Estimated Uses of Gold
(metric tons)
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Flow Demand 1159.6 1180.3 1335.6 1339.2 1287.8 800.2 496.1
Jewelry 913.3 906.2 1062.6 1058.7 992.7 505.2 267.5*
Electronics 84.2 102.4 93.6 90.6 110.2 129.5 93.3
Dentistry 64.5 64.6 63.9 70.0 72.5 72.7 65.3*
Other Industrial
and Decorative 57.6 63.1 61.9 68.2 71.2 71.0 60.7
Fake Coins, Medals
and Medallions 40.0 44.0 53.6 51.7 41.2 21.8 9.3
Stock Demand +58.8 +56.8 -61.7 -43.1 +115.4 +601.0 +908.2**
Purchases by
Governments -619.0 +90.2 +236.4 -96.4 + 152.4 -6.2 n.a.
Hoarding +72.0 +60.0 +88.0 +80.0 -8.0 +46.0 n.a.
Speculation +537.0 -118.0 -432.0 -79.0 -91.0 +508.0 n.a.
and Investment
Official Coins +67.8 +24.6 +45.9 +52.3 +62.0 +53.2 +293.9
* Does not include Middle East and Far East demand for these purposes.
** Includes errors in estimates ofother uses.
Source: Peter D. Fells, Gold 1974 (London: Consolidated Gold Fields, Ltd., 1974), pp. 12 and 13.
E. M. Bernstein Ltd., U.S. Participation in the Free Gold Market, Report No. 75/1, p. 3.
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